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Size and Scope of the Financial Task
THE BOMBING of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese on the morn-
ing of December 7, 1941 catapulted the United States into
the second World War as a full scale participant. This cli-
mactic event provided the occasion for our formal declara-
tions of war in rapid succession against Japan, Germany, and
Italy. Nevertheless, in the perspective of history it will prob-
ably be viewed not as an isolated incident, but rather as the
final link in a long chain of events that had drawn this country
steadily closer to the center of the vortex. Such a perspective
seems especially appropriate for a study of the financial prob-
lems arising from our participation in the war. To find a
logical starting point for an analysis of this kind, we must
turn back, not to December 1941, but to May i6, 1940, when
the defense program was formally launched by President
Roosevelt.
At that time, public attention in the United States was
focused largely upon the tremendous events taking place on
the Continent of Europe, and Japanese aggression appeared
to most citizens as neither immediate nor serious. The rapid
succession of German military victories in the spring and early
summer of 1940 brought a quickening sense of national dan-
ger to the United States. With the collapse and capitulation
of France in June, it dawned on most Americans that instead
of being safe and distant witnesses to a 'phony' war, they were
confronted by a mighty German army in actual control of a
major portion of the Atlantic seaboard of Europe directly
opposite their own shores. At the same time it became pain-
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fully clear that the sole remaining bulwark between the
United States and a direct struggle for the control of the At-
lantic Ocean was British seapower.
From the outset, the defense program was viewed as a crisis
program, not a long-run plan for the gradual strengthening
of our defenses. War was no longer considered a remote con-
tingency, but an imminent possibility. The great majority of
the American people had become convinced that our great
wealth and productive capacity would be of little value in a
major military emergency if modern implements of warfare
in huge quantities were not actually on hand when needed.
During the next eighteen months the United States moved
step by step in the direction of involvement in the war, and
each successive step was marked by the progressive amplifi-
cation and elaboration of the defense program. One notable
step was the transfer, in early autumn i940,of fifty over-age
destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for a string of naval
and air bases. Another was the passage of the Lend-Lease Act
in March i 941,whenwe announced our intention of provid-
ing armaments and supplies without limit to all opponents
of Axis Still another was our military occupatidn
of Iceland and the subsequent start of an un-
declared naval war against Germany in the North Atlantic.
When the Neutrality Act was amended in early autumn 1941,
in order to permit the arming of our merchant vessels and
the free movement of our ships into belligerent waters, it was
apparent that only a fine line separated the United States
from formal participation in the war.
Although the threat of Japanese aggression was growing
steadily throughout this period, public consciousness of the
danger was slight. When the sudden and treacherous attack
on December 7 actually occurred, the American people as a
whole were still mentally unprepared. The shock was so great
that the declarations of war against the United States two
days later by Germany and Italy came almost as an anti-
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1 ECONOMIC MAGNITUDE OF OUR MILITARY PROGRAM
The original defense program was an armament plan of im-
mense proportions. In addition to providing for a two-ocean
navy, Congress showed itself ready and willing to vote ap-
propriations for airplanes, guns, tanks, and other armaments
practically without limit. As depicted in Chart i, these sums
rose markedly during the succeeding months as the United
States was drawn ever closer to the brink of war. By De-
cember i, 1941, even before our actual entry into the war,
Congress had authorized defense expenditures and contract
commitments amounting to some $64 billion, a sum almost
twice as great as the three year total of federal civil and mili-
tary outlays during the fiscal years 1917, 1918, and 1919.
Some expenditures, such as those for battleships, were sched-
uled to be spread over five years, but most were expected to
be spent in a much shorter period.
After our declarations of war in December 1941, the de-
fense program at once became a war program. Congress au-
thorized vast new expenditures and every effort was made to
expedite and expand our military production. By May 1,
1942 total Congressional authorizations had reached $165
billion, and the end was very far from being in sight. Actual
military outlays in the fiscal year 1942 amounted to about
$26 billion (Table 1, for data to May); while revised estimates
for the fiscal year 1943, published by the Bureau of the Budget
on April 24, 1942, call for total military expenditures of about
$70 billion. American military outlays in 1918, the peak year
of our first World War effort, did not exceed $14.6 billion,
and the purchasing power of the dollar at wholesale in June
1918 was only two-thirds as great as at the end of 1941.
Radical Redirection of Economic Activity Needed
The primary economic problem posed by a major military
emergency is fundamentally the same in any country not or-
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radical redirection of economic activity. In no fiscal year
between 1922and1935 did the combined expenditures for
the United States army and navy reach $i billion. They rose
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Figures for the last two months for appropriations and commitments are
preliminary.SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE FINANCIAL TASK 7
TABLE1





Monthlylative Monthlylative Monthly lative
1940
Julyand
earlier 12,325 12,325 4,026 4,026 187 187
Aug. 0 12,325 775 4,801 213 400
Sept. 6,155 18,480 5,467 10,268 234 634
Oct. 2,054 20,534 1,932 12,200 312 946
Nov. —19 20,515 990 13,190 390 1,336
Dec. 8o 20,595 i,i6o 14,350 483 1,819
1941
Jan. 228 20,823 1,372 15,722 589 2,408
Feb. 544 21,367 745 16,467 607 3,015
March 9,891 31,258 2,472 18,939 797 3,812
April 4,413 35,671 20,288 823 4,635
May 1,404 37,075 24,126 904 5,539
June 0 37,075 3,675 27,801 892 6,431
July 11,653 48,728 3,967 31,768 1,019 7,450
Aug. 8,392 57,120 4,084 35,852 1,191 8,641
Sept. 612 57,732 4,501 40,353 1,42310,064
Oct. 6,471 64,203 5,262 45,615 1,65811,722
Nov. 126 64,329 1,782 47,397 1,53213,254
Dec. 12,196 76,508 5,093 52,529 2,17015,251
1942
Jan. 17,164 93,672 8,414 60,943 2,22917,480
Feb. 21,591 115,263 20,932 81,875 2,39119,871
March P 80,373 145,636 P 16,395 98,270 3,18123,002
April P19,037p164,673 Pio8,ig6 3,57126,507
May o 164,673 p9,731 P117,900 30,387
The war activities of all United States government agencies (including Lend-
Lease) plus the war activities of government owned corporations, but not
foreign orders, are included.
"Only preliminary data available, but April 1942 figures in the table are
more recent than those on which Chart iis based. May figures are omitted
from the chart.8 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
gradually from 1936to1940, but their total in the fiscal year
1940 was only $i.8 billion. To effect quickly a manifold ex-
pansion of such expenditures requires a redirection of a major
fraction of the country's productive resources. Bombing and
fighter planes, ships, tanks, guns, shells, and countless other
implements of modern war are very special and very expen-
sive kinds of goods, which require elaborate and specifically
designed equipment for their production. Only a tiny pro-
portion of the enormous quantities suddenly required can be
supplied by existing factories which have previously special-
ized in the making of these goods. To accelerate production,
other factories must be diverted from their normal products;
and to assure ample future increases in output, many new fac-
tories must be built and equipped. The emergency likewise
stimulates demand for the principal materials from which
military products are made, for steel, aluminum, rubber,
chemicals, etc., and for the various kinds of labor needed to
produce them. Military demand for such materials and labor
competes with civilian.
The start of such a program is necessarily slow. Technical
experts in the War and Navy Departments and in private
industry must make detailed specifications for thousands of
separate items of materials and equipment, many of which
must be designed or redesigned to incorporate new inven-
tions and improvements suggested by most recent experience.
During the fiscal year 1941, only $6 billion were actually dis-
bursed by the federal government for national defense; but
$27 billion of commitments were entered into, and military
expenditures advanced to a level of approximately $i billion
per month. In June 1942 military outlays were running at a
monthly rate of about $4 billion, and were expected to reach
a rate of about $6 billion before the end of the calendar
year.
In the early stages of the program, the speed with which
'.economic resources in the United States could be turned to
the defense effort was limited primarily by the time requiredSIZE AND SCOPE OF THE FINANCIAL TASK 9
to design, let contracts for, and actually produce and assem-
ble the materials and products required; and by the political
and social inertia that impede rapid change. The retarding
influence of these factors tended to diminish, however, with
the passage of time. Even before we entered the war, the
American defense program, in magnitude and urgency, had
become a gigantic economic effort.
The War Effort Likely to A bsorb about One-half of the Gross
National Product 1
Theabsolute magnitude of our war effort is nominally gov-
erned by Congressional appropriations. These, in turn, are
likely to follow closely the estimates of needs prepared by the
military authorities. But for some time, at least, the needs so
estimated are likely to exceed substantially current capacity
to supply them. During the eighteen months prior to Decem-
ber 1941 our military authorities properly measured our
needs by the maximum requirements of a prolonged and
devastating major war. They sought a tremendous expansion
of the plant capacity for making munitions and similar goods,
as well as the maximum immediate output of munitions.
And now, under conditions of an all-out global war, Congress,
in effect, has given to the military requirements a 'blank
check' on the country's productive resources.
The extent to which this 'blank check' will be 'good' in
any single year, the limits of our economic effort on behalf of
a successful prosecution of the war, will be determined by the
practical capacity of our political and economic institutions
to divert productive resources from civilian to military uses,
and by the physical limitations upon the transferability of
resources from peacetime to military production. The diffi-
culties of bringing about such diversion are doubtless greater
in a democracy than under a totalitarian regime. The degree
in which they are overcome will be strongly influenced by
many factors. The speed and ease of diversion can be greatly
increased by vigorous and intelligent political leadership and10 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
well designed and well executed financial policies, by the
cooperative action of leaders in industry, labor, and govern-
ment, and by enthusiastic support of the program in the
newspapers, radio broadcasts, motion pictures, and other or-
gans of public opinion.
During former periods of peaceful international relations,
the people of the United States, relying upon the protection
afforded by their two ocean barriers, have not seen fit to build
up military strength. In wartime intensified sentiments of
patriotism make them willing to sacrifice their standard of
living. During igi8, the American people devoted approxi-
mately 25 per cent of their aggregate national output to mili-
tary purposes; during 1917—19, about i8 per cent.2
It seems highly probable that we shall devote a considerably
greater proportion of our aggregate national output to this
war effort than we did in 1918. As already mentioned, re-
vised budget estimates for the fiscal year 1943callfor military
outlays of about $70 billion. Such a level of expenditures, if
actually achieved, will mean that we shall probably be de-
voting to the war half of the gross national product. The
expected relations between the gross national product and
military outlays are discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 6.
2 TO VIEW WAR FINANCING SOLELY IN TERMS OF MONEY IS
SUPERFICIAL
All who give the matter even a moment's consideration will
recognize that financing a war is merely superficially a prob-
lem of money. Money is a highly useful instrument for meas-
uring economic values, exchanging goods and services and
organizing and regulating our economic activity; but it must
not be confused with the underlying goods and services. Air-
planes, guns, tanks, shells, and ships, and the clothing, food,
and other supplies needed for the men who make and use
them, can be produced with real resources alone. We can
obtain them only by applying our labor, factories, and ma-
chines to materials supplied by mines, forests, and farms,SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE FINANCIAL TASK 11
except to the very small extent that we can get some of them
from abroad in exchange for gold and securities, and to the
extent that we can draw on accumulated stocks of goods.
Money is of great value in the prosecution of the war effort,
but only as an instrument for organizing and obtaining con-
trol over these real resources. Whatever technical methods of
finance we use, the primary objective is to mobilize and divert
these real resources to military purposes.
3 CURRENT OUTPUT, NOT PAST OR. FUTURE, THE MAIN SOURCE
OF WAR GOODS
The economic requirements of the war must be met in the
main from current national output, from the day by day and
month by month products of our labor, our land, and our
capital equipment. The accumulated wealth of the past and
the wealth and income of the future can be drawn on only
by using up stocks of materials and finished goods, and by
failing to repair or replace durable capital equipment.
Although the aggregate man-made and natural wealth of
the United States amounts to several hundred billion dollars,
very little of it can be 'spent' quickly. Only a small part of
our accumulated wealth is in inventories of finished goods for
immediate use. The bulk of it, other than land, consists of
durable goods, such as factories, machinery, houses, railroads,
which cannot be 'used up' except over a fairly long period.
Ordinarily they yield net incomes, in the form of consumable
products, in any single year equal to merely a small fraction
of their capital values.
Nevertheless, beyond this net income, we may increase our
current gross income from them significantly, though at the
expense of the capital wealth to be bequeathed to the future,
by failing adequately to repair, maintain, and replace exist-
ing plant and machinery. The physical condition of most
items of capital equipment, and of consumer durable goods,
such as automobiles, commonly makes it possible to postpone
usual replacements for shorter or longer periods. To the ex-12 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
tent that such postponement is effected, labor and other re-
sources can be released for the military effort.
Likewise, many of the net additions ordinarily made to
capital equipment can be deferred for shorter or longer peri-
ods: various kinds of public construction, commercial office
buildings, residential construction, and expansion of produc-
tive facilities for the manufacture of various types of con-
sumer goods.
The aggregate annual outlays of the American people for
capital goods of all kinds, including maintenance, repairs,
and replacements, usually run into large sums and account
for a considerable fraction of the gross output of goods and
services. During i 921—38 these outlays, including net capital
exports, are estimated to have averaged over $17 billion an-
nually, and to have accounted for about 23 per cent, on the
average, of the yearly gross output of goods and services.3 To
the extent that the needs of the war are met from these
sources, they can be said, in a sense, to be supplied at the ex-
pense of the future.
In a somewhat different sense, a great war effort may cause
hardships in the future by the distortions and dislocations
created in the productive organization of the country. The
wholesale diversion of economic activity from civilian to
military production may disorganize whole industries and
cause numerous enterprises to lose their established markets
and goodwill. The result is likely to be similar when violent
dislocations occur in international trade. Although not re-
flected by the direct money costs of the war, such losses are
none the less important. In these ways, as well as by reduc-
tions in the capital equipment which would otherwise be
available, a major military effort may leave an unfortunate
heritage to the future.
But we cannot borrow from the future in any other sense.
We cannot feed soldiers with wheat not yet grown, arm them
with guns not yet made, or transport them in trucks and ships
not yet built. Although the forms of financing may includeSIZE AND SCOPE OF THE FINANCIAL TASK 13
long term loans, the present generation, in a real sense, must
inevitably bear most of the burden of the war.
Foreign Loans, Gifts, and Loot
Germany and Great Britain have been able to make substan-
tial use of several further means of meeting the economic
demands of war. Loot from conquered territories has been
conspicuous in the case of Germany, although it cannot be esti-
mated. Germany not only appropriated stocks of foodstuffs and
similar consumption goods, but also took over and operated
munitions and other factories, and imported large numbers of
workers from conquered countries to till her farms and work
in her factories on terms suggesting slave labor. The Under-
Secretary of Foreign Affairs reported to the British I-louse of
Commons in March 1941thatthe countries under German
domination, exclusive of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania,
and Bulgaria, were then contributing the equivalent of $4.6
billion annually to maintain the German war machine. Of
this sum, billion were estimated to conie from France,
$3oo million from Belgium, $272 million from Norway, $2 i6
million from Holland, and million from Denmark.4
Great Britain has received large gifts of munitions and
food from the United States, and has purchased additional
supplies with the proceeds from sales of stocks and bonds of
American corporations and governmental obligations for-
merly held by British nationals. As in the first World War,
though in much smaller amounts, she has also borrowed in
the United States, using the proceeds of her loans to pur-
chase American supplies.
By borrowing from other countries and their citizens, and
by selling securities and other properties to them and taking
the proceeds in goods or in claims on goods, a country may
shift a significant part of the current burden of a military effort
to others. Later generations in the borrowing country will
have to shoulder the burden of paying interest and repaying14 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
the principal of the foreign loans, and of foregoing the in-
come from the securities and other assets liquidated abroad.
In such a case, which is different from that of an internal
loan, it may be proper to speak of 'shifting the cost to the
future'.
The possibilities in this connection for the United States
seem remote, or at best extremely limited in this war. There
are no remaining non-belligerent nations in the world with
highly developed industrial organizations that might be able
to furnish this country with a large supply of modern arma-
ments. We may obtain part of our raw materials from abroad
by means of foreign borrowing, the liquidation of securities,
or in exchange for some of our vast monetary gold holdings
of approximately $23 billion. Nevertheless, it seems most un-
likely that the United States will be able to meet any large
part of the cost of the war in this manner.
4 PAYING FOR THE WAR THROUGH AN INCREASE IN THE NATIONAL
OUTPUT
With the exceptions just noted, there are o•niy two means of
providing the goods and services needed for a major military
effort. One is to bring about an increase in the aggregate na-
tional output through a fuller use of existing productive re-
sources, part or all of the increase taking the form of military
goods. The other is to curtail civilian use of productive re-
sources and to divert the portion released to military purposes.
To the extent that the first alternative is achieved, the second
will be unnecessary.
If our total national production of goods and services could
be expanded instantaneously and indefinitely, our military
needs could be obtained entirely from the increased national
output while the consumption of goods and services for non-
military or civilian purposes could continue unrestricted.
The basic limitations to such an ideal achievement are physi-
cal—functions of men, materials, and machines. Thus, when
the entire man-power of a nation is fully and most effectivelySIZE AND SCOPE OF THE FINANCIAL TASK 15
employed in the production of goods and services, using mate-
rials and machines most efficiently, that nation can be said to
have achieved its maximum national output possible within
the framework of the then current industrial technique. Bet-
ter machines and more efficient methods of production would
tend, of course, to lift the ceiling of maximum output, but
to introduce them is usually a slow process and for practical
purposes has little influence in any given situation.
The national output may increase substantially in the short
run, however, if large amounts of idle productive resources
can be brought into utilization. To the extent that this slack
is general, rather than concentrated in a few special lines,
and to the extent that the types of resources and skill are well
suited to the kinds of product that are in greater and greater
demand, the national output may be expanded rapidly with-
out adding materially to the physical potential.
But when the kinds of goods to be produced change radi-
cally, time is of the essence. To build additional plants and
machines, to increase the supply and direct the flow of all
essential materials, and finally to train and find employment
for unskilled and other workers in positions where their skills
can be most efficiently utilized takes time. The very creation
of a national defense plan and the building of a central or-
ganization to direct it are in themselves time consuming. If
sufficient time is allowed to accomplish these several neces-
sary steps, a nation may approximate the theoretical maxi-
mum of its productive capacity.
The difficulty is that the inexorable urgency of war rarely
grants a country enough time. If the emergency is sufficiently
grave and immediate, such as an invasion by the enemy, it will
be necessary merely to utilize existing facilities to the best
advantage. Plants and machines producing goods for civilian
consumption will be rapidly converted into the manufacture
of war equipment, and civilian consumption will decline as
military production increases. Under such circumstances,
maximum speed takes precedence over maximum output, andi6 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
national output, instead of rising rapidly, may actually show
a net decline.
Hence there is an inevitable conflict between the alterna-
tive goals of maximizing total national output and of achiev-
ing the desired military result within the shortest possible
time. The tendency to compromise between these two ex-
tremes will be continuous, and the final choice in each in-
stance will be by governmental leaders. They must judge the
gravity of the emergency and the willingness of the people to
concur in any intended course of action.
This tendency to compromise was clearly evident through-
out the prewar phase of our armament program. It seems
correct to state that during the first year of the defense effort
methods that tended toward maximum production were em-
phasized rather than maximum speed. By summer 1941, how-
ever, when the urgency of the general situation became àp-
parent, the emphasis was reversed. With our entry into the
war, speed became, of course, the paramount consideration.
In the next two chapters, we attempt to estimate the effects
of our war effort on national output. These estimates will
serve in turn as the basis for later judgments on all aspects
of financing the war. Only by actual forecasts of the probable
future level, composition, and distribution of the national
product can we hope to judge the extent of the sacrifices
which must be made and be in a position to analyze intelli-
gently the many fiscal problems in connection with an effi-
cient achievement of the national goal.
Study of national income levels in the leading belligerent
countries in this war, and a review of our own experience in
the' first World War would be helpful but we have space
merely to point out a few of the more important highlights
that are relevant to our own immediate problem.
German Rearmament Experience
Looking first at the German experience, we find an outstand-
ing example of a nation which started its vast rearmamentSIZE AND SCOPE OF THE FINANCIAL TASK 17
program at the bottom of a great depression when profits and
wages were very low and unemployment was widespread, and
had six and one-half years in which to work out a carefully
organized and coordinated plan of expansion while the rest
of the world slept. Germany, according to Hitler, spent in
that period over 90 billion marks on armaments. This colossal
total was made possible chiefly by a steady and substantial
increase in the national income. In fact, it has been claimed
that not only was the entire armament program paid for out
of the increment to national income, but also that civilian
consumption actually increased 15 to 20 per cent. Although
such claims are probably exaggerated by ignoring the inferior
quality of goods due to widespread reliance upon substitute
or Ersatzproducts,there was apparently no appreciable de-
cline in aggregate civilian consumption before the war started
in September 1939.6
Ithas been estimated that approximately 6,ooo,ooo workers
were unemployed in 1933. Almost immediately the Nazi
regime launched a vast public works program, which was con-
verted rapidly into an armament program. Government ex-
penditures, together with the drastic methods applicable
under a totalitarian regime alone, gave employment rapidly
to idle workers. In addition, the entire population worked
more hours a week. As an integral part of the program, wages
were frozen at the depression levels and prices were progres-
sively controlled. The great increment in national income
which occurred as the expansion program became effective
was then skimmed off by means of drastic taxation and forced
loans. Although resort was had to considerable bank credit
borrowing, especially in the earlier phases of this period, ac-
tual price inflation was held in check by rigid restrictions and
progressive rationing. As a result, the level of wholesale prices
rose oniy about 15 per cent between 1933 and 1939.
The estimated course of German national income between
1929 and 1940, together with the growth of military expendi-FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
tures and governmental revenue is set forth in Table By
1938Germanywas faced with a severe shortage of labor and
for a while it looked as though the ceiling for national rn-
come had been reached. This situation was alleviated to
some extent by a better coordination and rationalization of
industry, but chiefly by an influx of workers from Italy, Aus-
tria, and Czechoslovakia, and later by the forced labor of a
large army of war prisoners from Poland, the Low Countries,
and France. By these and other means the national income
was raised from a level of 79 billion marks in 1938 to ap-
proximately ioo billion in 1940.
TABLE 2





FISCAL YEAR GOVERN-TO NATL.
BEGINNING NATIONAL MILITARY MENTAL INCOME
APRIL1 INCOME OUTLAYS REVENUES %
1929 75.9 .7 9.0(1928) 1
1933 46.6 3.0 6.8 6
1934 52.7 6.o 8.2 11
1935 58.4 10.0 9.7 17
1936 63.1 11.0 11.5 17
1937 71.0 i6.o 14.0 23
1938 79.0 25.0 17.7 32
1939 88.0 45.0 23.6 51
1940 100.0 49.0 34.0 49
SinceSeptember 1939 the claim cannot be made that the
German war program was achieved without curtailing civilian
consumption, despite the rise in national income. At the end
of 1940 only about half of Germany's war expenditures was
estimated as being derived from the national income inc:re-
ment, approximately a quarter from the curtailment in civilian
consumption, and the balance from a reduction of inventories
and the failure to replace worn-out capital goods.8SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE FINANCIAL TASK 19
The belief has been widespread that there was something
mysterious, or even miraculous about the German armament
achievement. The above analysis should make clear that it
was nothing of the sort. In short, the achievement was ren-
dered possible by holding civilian consumption at or very
close to the minimum levels of the depression and di-
verting to armament production nearly all of the increment
to national income which resulted from the full employment
of men, materials, and equipment.
British Experience Since
Inthe experience of Great Britain we have a very different
development. Although British military expenditures in-
creased gradually during the years just before the war, the
total in 1938, the year of the Austrian annexation and the
Munich settlement, amounted to only 7 per cent of the esti-
mated national income. Meanwhile, Germany was spending
almost one-third of her total national income on armaments.
Consequently, the outbreak of war the next year found Britain
woefully unprepared from the standpoint of modern military
requirements. Although she was faced with the necessity of a
rapid reorganization of her industrial machine on a wartime
basis, evidence is slight that the urgency was fully appreciated
by spring 1940 when the Churchill government took office.
Thereafter, the war effort was pushed intensively and mili-
tary expenditures were estimated, for the fiscal year ended
April 1, 1941, at about one-half of the immediate prewar
national income.9
According to estimates prepared by the British Treasury,
the British national income in 1940 amounted to mil-
lion compared with f4,415 million ifl1938,the last prewar
year.'° These figures are based on current pounds sterling and
have not been deflated to a common price level. Since the
British cost of living index rose more than 25 per cent be-
tween 1938 and 1940, as compared with a rise of i6.6 per
cent in the national income as shown above, no substantial20 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
increase in real national income occurred during the period,
and perhaps an appreciable net decline took place.
Although the publication of British indexes of industrial
activity stopped in the autumn of 1939, considerable external
evidence supports the above conclusion. Despite a total of
approximately 1,200,000 unemployed workers in the summer
of industrial activity in Great Britain was at a high
level. The index of industrial production averaged 123.1
(1929ioo) for the first six months of the year, and the level
of national income was estimated at almost 20 per cent above
that of 1929. Partly because of the absence of slack in plant
and equipment, and partly because of much delay and con-
fusion after the start of hostilities, idle workers were re-
employed very slowly. In fact, the number out of work on
December i 1, 1939 was actually 13o,ooo gTeater than on Au-
gust 15, and it was stated that "the expansion in the military
sector of industry was considerably smaller than the decline
in the civil sector".12 Unemployment dropped slowly there-
after but only in the spring of '94' could substantially full
employment be said to have been achieved.
After August i 940 industrial production was unquestion-
ably hampered seriously by the intensive German airraids,
although the extent of the damage has not been reported.
Heavy shipping losses of raw materials added to the difficulties
by reducing imports. All in all, real national income in Britain
in 1940 and 1941 was apparently little if any higher than in
1938, although in terms of current monetary
units was higher because of the rapid rise in prices during the
first year of the war. The conclusion is that the British war
effort, except for gifts from abroad, is being paid for very
largely by a curtailment of civilian consumption and liqui-
dation of assets.
American Experience in World War I
The course of national income in the United States during
the first World War is shown in the accompanying table. AllSIZE AND SCOPE OF THE FINANCIAL TASK 21
figures have been deflated to the level of 1913 prices in order
to represent the changes in real national income. In current
dollars, national income gained tremendously in 1917 and
1918 as a result of the great rise in prices but national income
must be expressed in terms of a common price level before
it can indicate changes in the actual production of goods and
services.
ESTIMATED NATIONAL INCOME
(millions of 1913 dollars)
1913 .1914 .1915 1916 .1917 1918
35,600 33,600 35,300 41,300 41,900 39,100
W. I. King, Income in the United States (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 1922), II, 234.
Between 1914 and igi6, with the business revival set in
motion very largely by the steadily growing demand from the
warring nations of Europe, real national income.rose approxi-
mately 23 per cent. Huge shipments of grains, meats, cotton,
and other raw materials swelled exports and by 1916 many
manufacturing plants were actively producing shells and
other munitions for Great Britain and France. These factors
induced an unusually high level of industrial activity in 1916
which assumed the proportions of a boom.
Despite the earlier production of certain war equipment
for the Allies, we were poorly prepared when we entered the
war in the spring of 1917.Littleslack existed inour plant
capacity and in our labor supply. We need not repeat the
well known details of the remarkable war achievement; it is
sufficient for our purposes merely to point out that it was
accompanied by no perceptible increase in our real national
income, which rose little more than i per cent from 1916 to
1917, and declined approximately 7 per cent in 1918.
Present Situation in the United States
So much for the general background. What of our present
situation? At the outset it should be clear that our situation22 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
is quite different from the German. We started the defense
program with a fairly high level of business activity, with a
reluctance to regiment capital and labor, and under the ne-
cessity of completing our armament program quickly. N ever-
theless, at the time of Pearl Harbor our situation with
respect to the outlook for national output seemed more favor-
able than that faced by Great Britain in the summer of
and more favorable than our position in 1917 and 1918. On
asset side of our ledger we still had a considerable reserve
of unemployed, estimated at about four million. Also, we had
great and diverse natural resources, and an understanding of
the technique of mass production probably unequaled else-
where in the world. On the debit side of the ledger, however,
obstacles to further expansion were present.
First, national output had already increased substantially
since the defense program was launched. As compared with
approximately $88 billion for 1939,the,gross prod-
uct for 1941 is estimated at about billion (in 1940 dol-
lars), an increase of over 28, per cent.
The simple fact is that, since we did not feel the necessity
of immediately converting our facilities to military purposes,
national output expanded smoothly and rapidly between
spring 1940andautumn 1941.Inmost lines of industry ex-
cess plant capacity was considerable, supplies of essential mate-
rials were ample, and large numbers of skilled workers were
still unewployed. While the slack in our economic machine
was being absorbed under the stimulus of defense orders,
many new plants and machine tools were being constructed
solely to manufacture military equipment. The purchasing
power thereby created quickly spilled over into a demand for
non-defense goods, and the production of civilian, as well as
military, goods was tremendously stimulated. Thus, through-
out the first full year of our defense effort, one could say that
military production was being achieved entirely from the in-
crement to the national product, not from any net reduction
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Good reasons exist for believing, however, that this period
of easy expansion had drawn to a close by the autumn of
1941, even before our entry into the war. Many of our basic
industries, outstanding examples of which were steel and
aluminum, had been operating at capacity for many months.
Defense demands for such materials were rising almost daily
as new plants for the manufacture of military equipment
came into operation. It was also clear that further expansion
of our productive capacity for many such essential materials
would be slow and inadequate. This situation created the
first, and perhaps the most important, of the so-called 'bottle-
necks' in industry and necessitated the establishment early in
1941ofpriorities for rationing most metals, many chemicals,
and some other essential materials. By summer 1941 we were
already painfully aware of shortages in many such items.
Another important bottleneck had become more and more
apparent in the labor supply. Although the total of un-
employed was still considerable at the time of Pearl Harbor,
despite the absorption of almost six million workers into
industry, the army, and the navy during 1940 and 1941, a
shortage of skilled workers was already evident. No adequate
means of overcoming this shortage appears other than by
giving extensive training to unskilled workers, which is nec-
essarily time consuming. The possibilities of increasing out-
put through lengthening the work week also seem limited. So
firmly established is the forty hour week in such a wide seg-
ment of industry that a substantial lengthening of the work
week would be resisted strenuously.
Although some further expansion in national output seems
probable in 1942—43, the rate is likely to be considerably
lower than during the first eighteen months of the defense
effort, and further growth of our military production must
be accompanied by curtailment in• the production of civilian
goods. This situation was clearly evident by autumn 1941,
when the output of automobiles and other consumer durable
goods was cut drastically. Immediately after the outbreak of24 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
war further severe curtailments in many lines of civilian pro-
duction were announced in order to make way a more
rapid expansion of military production.
5 SUBSTANTIAL DIVERSION OF RESOURCES TO MILiTARY USE COM-
PATIBLE WITH LITTLE IMMEDIATE PRIVATION
Substantial diversion of economic resources to war purposes
does not mean that a commensurate reduction must follow
immediately in the living standard of the American peop'e.
As previously indicated, some part of these resources will
come from additions to our total national production arising
from the fuller use of productive resources. Some part will
come from a reduction in new capital facilities for civilian
use, and a postponement of customary maintenance and re-
placement of capital facilities. Still another part may be de-
rived from a liquidation of business inventories, as well as
from an increase in imports. Civilian consumption will clearly
be curtailed considerably, but so far curtailment has been
mainly in consumer durable goods, such as automobiles and
refrigerators, rather than in such nondurables as food and
clothing.
6 OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL POLICIES
The primary task of financial measures and of various meas-
ures of direct compulsion in connection with the war may be
said to be fourfold: /i) To bring about the fullest practicable use of our produc-
tive resources;
2) To facilitate a prompt and adequate diversion of the nec-
essary resources to military needs;
Todistribute the sacrifices among our citizens in ways that
most nearly accord with publicly accepted ideas of fairness;
4) To leave as a postwar legacy as little disorder as possible
in the economic structure.13
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be judged primarily in the light of the first three of these
objectives, the public official, the professional student of pub-
lic affairs, and the intelligent layman cannot afford to ignore
the various longer run considerations involved in the fourth.
If the war could be financed with equal facility by taxation
or borrowing, the problems associated with a tremendous
growth of the public debt might properly influence us in the
direction of depending more upon taxation than upon bor-
rowing. Similarly, it would be intelligent to mold financial
policies with some regard to the problems of economic re-
adjustment which will arise when the military emergency is
over. In this study, more than passing attention is given to
considerations of this character. On the other hand, no at-
tempt is made to appraise alternative financial policies in terms
of remoter and more comprehensive goals, such as fundamen-
tal changes in the economic structure of our society. This is
not to say that appraisal in these terms may not properly
command the attention of others. We are concerned, how-
ever, with the narrower problem of examining and appraising
alternative methods of war financing within the framework
of our existing institutions, save for such modifications in the
latter as seem inseparably associated with today's military
emergency.
- NOTES
I The gross national product is a measure, in dollar terms, of the total out-
put of the national economy, and should not be confused with the widely
used term national income (whether gross or net). The net national income
is a highly useful measure of the performance of a national economy in
peacetime, when the dominant objective may properly be regarded as the
provision of goods for current civilian consumption and the maintenance and
increase of productive equipment to ensure and expand the future flow of
such goods.
The gross national incom.e differs from the net in that the former is
reckoned without the deductions from output—allowances for depreciation
and depletion—estimated as needed for replacing wornout productive facili-
ties and thus maintaining the future flow.
The gross national product, as here used, differs from both concepts: not
only is it stated without allowance for depreciation and depletion, but it in-26 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
cludes also certain important items—business taxes and provision of certain
reserves from business earnings—which are excluded from national income
estimates as they are customarily made. Calculation of the gross national
product in this way provides a result with which government expenditures
on military account can appropriately be compared, whereas they cannot
properly be compared with either net or gross national income. Such a
measure of the performance of a national economy in wartime recognizes
that the dominant objective is no longer provision of goods for civilian con-
sumption. Needless to say, the figure for gross national product runs larger,
perhaps very much larger, in any one year than the figure for net national
income or even gross national income.
2J. M. Clark has estimated that "during the calendar year igi8 we devoted
to the War some i6 billions' worth of goods and services out of a total na-
tional income of something over 6o billions, or over one-fourth of our total
income" (The Costs of the World War to the American People, Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1931, p. 122). W. I. King has estimated the proportion at 23.5
percent: see income in the United States (National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1922), II, 336.
The above comparison is in terms of national income rather than gross
national product; and the same is true of the comparisons for various nations
given in the text toward the end of this chapter. Corresponding data for
gross national product, as a basis of comparison, are not satisfactory for other
countries or for the United States in World War I. The reader will under-
stand that, as gross national product necessarily exceeds national income, a
military expenditure running to one-fourth of national income is a some-
what smaller fraction, but still a very important fraction, of the correspond-
ing gross national product.
S Data are from Simon Kuznets' National income and Its Composition, I;
Cotnmodity Flow and Capital Formation, 1919—1938,andBulletin Com-
modity Flow and Capital Formation in the Recent Recovery and Decline,
1932—1938 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941, and June 25,
1939).
4Cf.Commercial and Financial Chronicle, March 29, 1941,p.1972.
5As noted above, these comparisons are in terms of national income, not, as
would be more appropriate, gross national product. While some estimates of
gross national product, or an approximately similar measure of wartime
economic performance, have been made for certain other countries, they
have not been subjected to extensive criticism and verification. For the kind
of rough comparison needed in the accompanying text, we have therefore
relied upon the national income as a basis of reference.
6Thisstatement is made only in comparison with the consumption level in
at the nadir of the great depression, a level which probably could not be
lowered much further. Nevertheless, a considerable shift in the German con-
sumption pattern is known to have occurred after Because of the urgent
need for foreign exchange to purchase armament supplies from abroad, the
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sharply curtailed. This gave rise to the slogan, 'guns instead of butter'. Al-
though there may have been no general decline in the level of consumption
as a whole, the obvious shift from such imported items to staple foods pro-
duced domestically undoubtedly lowered the consumption level of certain
groups within the national economy.
7Allfigures are from a memorandum by Paul Studenski, 'How Nations
Procure Their Means of Defense or War', presented before the Conference
on Research in Income and Wealth, May 1941.Wenote that the national
income estimate of ioo billion RM for 1940,quotedin the foregoing table,
is probably somewhat exaggerated and the real ratio of military expenditures
to the national income for that year is probably higher than indicated.
For obvious reasons, the reliability of all German national statistics since
the advent of Hitler is open to serious question.
8Hettlage'Wer Bezahlt den Krieg?' (Who is Paying for the War?), Der
Deutsche Volkswirt, Dec. 20,1940.
9 Studenski,op. cit.
10BritishWhite Paper, An Analysis of the Sources of War Finance and an
Estimate of the National Income and Expenditure in ig3S and 1940,pre-
sented by the Financial Secretary of the Treasury to Parliament, April 1941.
11 CambridgeEconomic Service, Report for November 1940,p.8.
12Economist, Jan. 1940.
13 Whilethe avoidance of inflation is not mentioned explicitly as a primary
objective, the entire analysis stresses the principle that the achievement of
all the above objectives will be much more difficult if inflation is marked.